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 1 
Adolescent Citizenship, or 
Temporality and the Negation of Black Childhood in Two Eras 
 
Abstract: 
The history of negating black childhood, and the history of rendering the full potential of 
black citizenship an unbegotten promise, are paired together through violent notions of time. 
Examining black childhood in two eras, this article argues that childhood is deadly under 
anti-blackness because of its ambivalent and discrepant stickiness to black bodies, and its 
positioning of blackness within differing relations to futurity and temporality. The first 
section critically unpacks infantilizing discourses within colonial law, abolitionist discourse, 
and gradual emancipation during the antebellum era. The second undertakes an interrogation 
of the discursive constructions of Trayvon Martin’s adolescence during the so-called post-
racial era. Across these eras, the constructions of black childhood and adolescence as being 
out of time, as defined by prolonged dependency and elongated becoming, allow the 
violences of anti-blackness to continue amidst dubious claims to progress: the alleged success 
of Northern abolition, and the emergence of a post-racial society. Pairing the temporal 
negations of black childhood in these two eras, it offers the framing of adolescent citizenship. 
Adolescent citizenship is the produced relation between some citizens and the nation 
whereby the adolescent citizen’s demands for recognition are dismissed under the guise of 
the citizen’s, and the demand’s, inappropriate timing.  
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Introduction   
Processing the verdict of not guilty for George Zimmerman, Sybrina Fulton articulated both 
belief and disbelief that the jurors had not seen Trayvon Martin, her son, as an innocent child. 
In a complex and sorrowful analysis, Fulton said that initially the verdict came as “a 
complete shock,” as she was sure that the jury would see her son as “an average teenager that 
was minding his own business, that wasn’t committing any crime, that was coming home 
from the store, and were feet away from where he was actually going.”1 And yet, she says, 
“when I heard the verdict, I kind of understand the disconnect. And that maybe they didn’t 
see Trayvon as their son. They didn’t see Trayvon as a teenager. They didn’t see Trayvon as 
just a human being that was minding his own business.”2 
What Fulton forcefully elucidates here is that the jury was unable to find Martin 
intelligible within the confines of innocence, childhood, adolescence, and humanity. Given 
the circumstances of Martin’s profiling and murder by Zimmerman, as well as the racial 
make up of the six-person jury, of whom only one was not white, Fulton’s statement that the 
jurors did not see Martin as “their” son suggests that these categories are themselves shaped 
by whiteness. This claim, that innocence, childhood, adolescence, and humanity are racially 
scripted and unevenly distributed is not a novel one, but the need to persistently reiterate it is 
made increasingly clear amidst the persistence of deadly anti-black violence directed at 
young black people like Martin. Martin is of course not the first black child to be racially 
profiled and murdered. His murder on February 26, 2012, and the lack of justice he and his 
family received has a history.
3
 Martin is important, however, because amidst the so-called 
post-racial era he became a national symbol of the disproportionate number of fatal shootings 
of black people by law enforcement (and vigilantes), and the institutional racism of the 
criminal justice system, and he was a catalyst for the Black Lives Matter movement.
4
 In the 
wake of Martin’s murder, many scholars have argued an explanation for the disproportionate 
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violences young black people face is that black children are denied access to the protective 
confines of childhood itself. Childhood innocence, scholars have argued, is raced white, and 
the contested and tenuous concept of childhood disintegrates for black children. In this 
article, I seek to contribute to this scholarship by putting forth another articulation of black 
childhood and adolescence, one which unpacks the deadly historical antecedents of, and 
contemporary mobilizations of what Fulton calls “the disconnect.”  
This conceptualization, which I arrive at through an analysis of black childhood in 
two different eras, seeks to instill some ambivalence into the reading of childhood’s alleged 
inability to accommodate black children, and it does so through an attending to the ways in 
which childhood, adolescence, and anti-blackness are entangled with temporality. One of my 
main arguments is that childhood and adolescence, as ambivalent categories with blurred 
boundaries, do and do not stick to black children and young people. Their discrepant 
stickiness, I demonstrate, is produced in response to changes in the historical conditions of 
blackness, and the capacity for anti-blackness to sustain itself despite socio-political, legal, 
and cultural shifts over time. In the moments in which childhood and adolescence do stick, 
however, it is not to offer innocence nor protection to young black people, but rather to 
confine blackness within the temporal suspensions that are also constitutive of childhood and 
adolescence. For childhood and adolescence (historically constructed categories I understand 
as simultaneously fantasmatic, figural, and ‘real’) are not adequately defined by innocence, 
purity, and protection. They are not straightforwardly ontological; they are also, to varying 
degrees, temporal positions. They name subjects who are defined by a relationship to futurity, 
growth, delay, and a temporal “estrangement” from an adulthood which they are 
simultaneously defined in opposition to, yet destined to become.
5
 
Attending to temporality alongside the characteristics of innocence, purity, and 
dependency is important, in part because these latter characteristics do not speak to the reality 
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of contemporary childhoods,
6
 nor, as Toby Rollo documents, have they ever.
7
 Indeed, Rollo 
argues that black people face violence not because they are denied access to childhood, but 
precisely because they are confined within childhood, a category that has been historically 
naturalized as a site of violence, subservience, dependency, lack, and criminality. And yet, 
cultural historians of childhood have convincingly unpacked myriad ways in which 
childhood has historically been denied to black and indigenous children, precisely as black 
and indigenous adults are infantilized.
8
 Stepping back from these two opposing positions—
that black children face disproportionate deadly violence because they are either denied 
childhood or because they are firmly located within it—I work in this article to argue that 
what makes childhood so deadly under enduring conditions of anti-blackness is both its 
ambivalent and discrepant stickiness to black bodies, and its positioning of blackness within 
differing relations to futurity and temporality. This article thus asks: On what grounds do 
black children and adolescents have a hold on futurity? Or, if not futurity, then what relation 
to temporality has come to be definitional of black childhood?  
In answering these questions, this article interrogates two eras under which childhood, 
adolescence, anti-blackness, and, I centrally argue, temporality, must be understood together. 
Here, I move between an analysis of black childhood in and leading up to the antebellum era, 
and an analysis located within the so-called “post-racial” era. While my intention is not to 
flatten the historical differences between these sites, I am making the case that there is much 
to learn about the consistency of anti-blackness in these seemingly separate moments. 
Moreover, the movement between eras that I offer here is done precisely against a narrative 
of progress which might question this move.
9
  
To establish my argument I open with an analysis of black childhood in and leading 
up to the antebellum era. Here, I undertake a historical analysis of what I call the discrepancy 
of black childhood by examining the ways in which childhood was and was not conferred to 
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black children and adults in law, discourse, and political imagination. This analysis leads me 
to an interrogation of the insidiousness of infantilization, and the ways in which the emergent 
framing of the child as a subject progressing into rights and responsibilities in this era 
allowed for the conditions of slavery to continue for black children and adolescents amidst 
so-called emancipation. My analysis of the discursive and material effects of gradual 
emancipation in the antebellum North suggests that it was precisely the black child’s 
ensnarement within a racially bifurcated conceptualization of childhood as a space of 
prolonged dependency and elongated becoming that allowed for the conditions of slavery to 
continue amidst declarations of the successes of Northern abolition.  
It is this very contradiction—the material violences of anti-blackness becoming 
increasingly deleterious for black children amidst claims to progress—which connects my 
analysis to the contemporary (and highly contested) “post-racial” era. I am not, to be clear, 
arguing that the contemporary moment is what might be considered post-race. Rather, my 
designation of this particular naming of the contemporary moment follows the scholarship 
which locates post-race as a particular white fantasy and wish fulfillment: a desire for the 
negation of racial critique which posits racism itself as existing only in a previous era.
10
 
Specifically, I interrogate a particular evocation of, and negation of, the pairing of the post-
racial fantasy with the discourses of childhood and adolescence evoked in the immediate 
aftermath of Trayvon Martin’s murder. As much has already been said about what William 
David Hart called the “execution” of Martin, my aim here is to offer an additional language 
of interrogation through the lens of childhood, adolescence, and temporality.
11
 Learning from 
Fulton’s critique which opened this article, I am specifically interested in the ways in which 
the wish-fulfillment of the post-racial mapped onto the negation of Martin’s childhood, and 
onto the discursive production of his location in a particular frame of “adolescent.” I argue 
that the inconsistent positioning of Martin’s childhood was a way of negotiating the 
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impossibility of holding together the fantasy of post-racial unity amidst the persistence of 
deadly anti-black violence. Borrowing from Lauren Berlant’s notion of “infantile 
citizenship,” I offer the frame of adolescent citizenship to describe the coupling of the post-
racial and the persistence of anti-black state violence, of which Martin’s murder is just a 
part.
12
  
 
Emancipation with Conditions  
Under slavery, the negotiation of black childhood was so integral to racial domination, the 
US economy, and white property ownership, that it ruptured the legal structure of inheritance 
that had previously been standardized in English common law. In December of 1662, the 
Virginia legislature overturned precedent and passed an act which stated: “all children [born] 
in this country [shall be] held, bond or free only according to the condition of the mother.”13 
Unlike the precedent of English common law which this act replaced, under which the 
condition of the father determined the status of the child, here, under what is called partus 
sequitur ventrem, the Virginia legislature tied a child’s bonded inheritance—and racial 
identity—to the mother. Partus was later enacted by other American colonies, and, as Wilma 
King argues, it “reflected the ‘racialization of sex’ and relieved white men of financial and 
legal responsibilities for the children they fathered by enslaved women.”14 Through this act, 
blackness, understood as a totalizing biological condition linked to blood and bondage, was 
thus rewritten as that which determined the livelihood of a child. Further reiterations of this 
law also worked to enslave mixed-race children with white mothers, and to criminalize white 
women themselves, for giving birth to such children.
15
 These laws worked to divorce white 
men of their biological and propertied accountability for the mixed-race children they 
fathered, and to discourage and criminalize sexual encounters between white women and 
black men. They also simultaneously crafted racial inheritance along blood lines such that, as 
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King writes, “white women could bear black children, but black women could not bear white 
children.”16  
 Negotiations of black childhood, however, were not just about how blackness was 
distributed to children, but also how the category of childhood was allocated and legislated 
for young black people. Tracking the literal distribution of the term “child,” Autumn 
Barrett’s investigation of child labor in colonial Virginia and New York uncovers that the 
word ‘negro,’ rather than ‘child,’ was used for enslaved black children, rendering them 
beyond the realm of human and instead into the category of property.
17
 This curtailment of 
child status for black children is in stark contrast, Barrett notes, to the use of the term 
“infant,” which was used for free and indentured English children up to the age of fourteen. 
Similarly, black childhood was negated within legislation whereby black men, women, and 
children were rendered into a single subjugated category. Laws persistently removed black 
and mixed-race children from the frame of childhood. Enacting legislation about how long 
indigenous prisoners of war could be held captive and placed into servitude, for example, a 
1670 act sought to negate black childhood: 
 
all servants not being Christians imported into this colony by shipping [shall be] 
slaves for their lives; but [those which] come by land shall serve, if [boys or girls], 
until thirty years of age, if men or women [twelve years] and no longer.
18
 
 
In this act, the Virginia legislature makes a distinction between indigenous adults and 
children (captured on land), while rejecting the need for that distinction for African slaves 
transported by boat. As Anna Mae Duane argues, “This law in particular denies the need to 
differentiate African youth from African adults, thus negating the possibility of [African] 
children’s progression into rights and privileges.”19 Part of the reason this negation was so 
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vital, Duane notes, is because it was at this time that the idea of childhood was beginning to 
accommodate the notion that children were “individuals whose temporary vulnerability 
demands care, and whose inherent potential demands freedom.”20 As such, fracturing 
childhood along racial lines such that it was irrelevant for enslaved Africans yet entrenched 
and elongated for white “infants” was a technique of negotiating who could be understood as 
vulnerable, in need of protection, and as having the potential for freedom.  
Duane, a literary scholar who explores the fundamental connection between 
childhood and emergent conceptualizations of racialization and the violence of national 
belonging, offers a daring reconceptualization of the work of infantilization. As Duane 
convincingly argues, this idea of the child as an emergent subject deserving of rights and 
recognition was nascent at this moment in time, and as such, the linking of the child and the 
slave through the metaphor of infantilization was a mapping of two deeply revolutionary 
claims: that children were social agents and that slavery was inhumane. For if the slave was a 
child, and if children had the newfound potential to “move out of a state of dependency [and] 
into the role of consenting adult,” then slaves-as-children did too.21 Indeed, this pairing of 
claims, Duane argues, is precisely why the Virginia legislature stepped in to erase the legal 
category of black childhood: it recognized the dangers of racialized infantilization to its 
dependence on slavery. 
This generous reading of infantilization, however, must be approached with caution. 
For not only is infantilization, as Duane and others have made clear, an unequal and 
dehumanizing technique which has justified paternalistic relationships of power like slavery, 
patriarchy, and colonialism across various times and spaces.
22
 It is also a form of subjection 
which places the subject in a particular relationship to time that functions precisely as to 
mitigate the subject’s citizenship claims. While Duane acknowledges and critiques this, I 
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want to unpack her generous reading of infantilization and then think through it more in 
relationship to the temporal critique that this paper is gesturing towards.  
For Duane, “reading infantilization as a one-way street, as a weapon that simply 
diminishes the subject being infantilized, obscures a much more complex engagement.”23 
Along these lines, Duane argues that “Infantilization […] is not a rhetorical club with which 
those in power simply disempower an individual by comparing him or her to a child. Rather, 
the structure of the child metaphor often changes the meanings of both terms.”24 Drawing on 
Homi Bhabha, we could argue, along with Duane, that the subjects who are produced through 
infantilization exist somewhere in the “area between mimicry and mockery.”25 The effects of 
this between-space, Bhabha argues, constitutes colonial power within “the excess or slippage 
produced by the ambivalence of mimicry.”26 Because of this, Bhabha argues, this 
ambivalence “does not merely ‘rupture’ the discourse,” it also exposes how “the very 
emergence of the ‘colonial’ is dependent […] upon some strategic limitation or prohibition 
within the authoritative discourse itself.”27  
My critique of this framing of the metaphor’s doubled meaning-making, however, 
might best be articulated through a re-reading of Bhabha’s notion of an “ironic 
compromise.”28 For it is within the production of colonial subjects as being “the subject of a 
difference that is almost the same, but not quite” that we need to situate historically the 
potentiation of this inherent limitation. This splitting of the slave-as-child-as-metaphor must 
be understood as operating within a racial order endemic to a state power that actively 
worked to regulate, appropriate, and discipline these ambivalent splittings as well. 
Understanding the uses of infantilization within a moment in which race was being 
entrenched as a necessary and essential difference between peoples, one that actively 
distributed freedom along racial lines, we must consider the terms upon which being 
understood as child-like—as being almost a child but not quite—came into being.  
 10 
Speaking to the entrenchment of racial difference at this time, Levander argues that 
the “repeated discursive representations of the child work[ed] initially to install and then to 
reinforce race as a founding, unstable element” of subjectivity, nationhood, and freedom.29 It 
is important to recognize, then, that the generous understanding of the doing of 
infantilization—the framing of infantilization as threatening to a racial order—assumes that 
the childhood and the adulthood that these infantilized black subjects might occupy was the 
same as the limited conceptualization of the subject-citizen at the time. This, however, was of 
course not the case, a fact which becomes obvious not just by considering the legal definition 
of citizen at the time, but also, and centrally for my argument, when re-considering how 
childhood was (and continues to be) multiply, incoherently, and ambivalently distributed to 
black bodies.  
In this light, it is important to understand that it was not actually the case that black 
children’s childhoods were erased by legislatures. Rather, it was the potential for 
emancipation as signified by childhood which was centrally at stake in the varied legal use of 
the frame of childhood for black children. Childhood, in Duane’s argument, worked as a 
structure through which liberty or enslavement was distributed. For her, what was being 
distributed along the lines of childhood was the link between race and freedom, and not 
necessarily childhood as a stage of life itself. As such, counter to the argument I made above 
about the persistent negating of black childhood in law, I want to now recognize that there 
was space for laws to differentiate between adults and children, but these laws tended to be 
ones whose differentiations were not about the potential for freedom that such a 
differentiation might make. Instead, the acknowledgement of a black child’s childhood 
within law was often acknowledged precisely as the terms of that child’s heightened value as 
laborer and property.
30
 We can see this in a 1740 South Carolina law, for example, which 
differentiated between a “grown man slave,” a “grown woman or boy slave above the age of 
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twelve,” and a “Negro child under the age of twelve.”31 This differentiation, while indeed 
recognizing, in deeply gendered terms, the existence of a space of childhood for enslaved 
black people, made this acknowledgement only so as to set different monetary rewards for 
their return, dead and alive, to the masters they fled.
32
  
Other laws which recognized black children’s childhood in relationship to labor and 
monetary value actually valued childhood over adulthood. Writing about the cataloging of 
the value attached to differently aged slaves, Barrett documents how “the monetary value of 
enslaved children increased as they became able to labor and survived to promise the return 
of future labor […] More than tripling from infancy to toddler, and almost doubling between 
eighteen months and three years.”33 Childhood here, as it attached to black bodies, thus 
related more to economic value for the plantation, rather than the inherent potential that 
slaves-as-children signified. While we could (and should) then acknowledge that anti-
blackness bifurcated liberty and potential freedom for children, we might also recognize the 
particular work that childhood itself did to maintain and justify this racism. 
While both abolitionist and apologist texts used the budding notion of children’s 
individuality and vulnerability to make the case for the end of slavery, or for its justified and 
necessary continuation, it is precisely because this took place through the infantilization of 
enslaved adults that the ways in which it worked for enslaved children (and as a logic of 
black childhood) was not so capacious. The insidiousness of this difference for black children 
became exceedingly clear at the end of the eighteenth century and in the beginning of the 
nineteenth, as Northern states began to end slavery. Prior to the Civil War, many states in the 
North, including Vermont in 1777, Pennsylvania in 1780, Rhode Island and Connecticut in 
1784, New York in 1799, and New Jersey in 1804, enacted a system of “gradual 
emancipation” in which children and young people were forced to remain slaves as part of 
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the terms of the emancipation law (in some states until the age of 28), often as compensation 
for their white masters’ loss of property.  
These terms varied across their enactments, and their specificities were negotiated 
within states’ General Assemblies for years. In New York, for example, a gradual abolition 
bill was initially petitioned for in 1794, but no action was taken on it until it was officially 
debated, multiple times a year, from 1797 to its final enactment in 1799. One of the central 
issues holding back its passage, as Arthur Zilversmit documents, was precisely about how 
slave owners would be compensated in regards to enslaved children.
34
 Slave owners argued 
that the “limited period of service” required of children would not pay for the cost of raising 
them, and as such demanded that the state further compensate slave owners for their losses. 
After years of debate, the final act passed by the New York General Assembly allowed for 
two scenarios: slave owners could either maintain black children as slaves until they were 
twenty-eight (if male) or twenty-five (if female), or they could abandon the children as 
paupers of the state. Here, too, however, the terms of abandonment were equally perverse. As 
Zilversmit writes:  
 
The state would reimburse the towns for the support of abandoned children at a 
monthly rate of up to $3.50 per child. Since the law did not prohibit overseers of the 
poor from binding out an abandoned Negro child to the same master who had 
‘abandoned’ him, masters could be paid up to $3.50 per month for every Negro child, 
over one year old, born to one of their slaves.
35
 
 
As is clear, then, gradual abolition laws, as Joanne Pope Melish argues, were not designed to 
legislate slavery out of existence.
36
 “What the gradual abolition statutes offered” Melish 
writes, “was a framework within which whites could enjoy abolition and slavery at the same 
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time—just as they had always enjoyed personhood and property together in their slaves.”37 
Indeed, these statutes were designed to maintain (via partus sequitur ventrem) the conditions 
of slavery, particularly for black children, and to create a new category of paradoxical quasi-
subject. “Children of slaves were a kind of oxymoron” Melish writes, “they were born free 
into servitude.”38 This category of “freeborn” was in and of itself a way of maintaining the 
conditions of slavery by creating a conceptual splitting between free and freeborn. This 
splitting, Melish argues, was predicated on a lingering notion of dependency which defined 
not just childhood but also adulthood: “in the view of most whites, since even the act of 
being freed represented the exercise of the owner’s power over the slave, an emancipated 
slave could never become a ‘free’ person but only a ‘freed’ one.”39  
In this sense, children freed by reaching the age of majority, for example, were 
understood as categorically dependent—both because they had been ‘dependent’ on their 
owners during childhood, and because their eventual status as a freed person was dependent 
on the very condition of them having been a slave. Gradual emancipation, then, produced 
two stages of limbo for black children. First, all living and future newborn black children 
were forced into mandatory service until the age of majority. Second, they were contained 
within the new concept of freeborn person of color, a conceptual defining that lingered past 
the age of majority and limited their access to recognition. Being “freed” thus relegated 
freeborn children of color into a different register of freedom, one which recognized (at least 
ambivalently) a status of personhood, but never of citizenship. 
Indeed, precisely because of the dehumanizing terms of legal slavery and the 
conditions which followed it, being child-like, being almost a white child but not quite, meant 
that infantilized black slaves could only be understood as subjects deserving of the potential 
for emancipation, and not necessarily that they could, like white (male) children, ever 
eventually come into the space of emancipated adult citizen. The encapsulation of black 
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adults into the space of child-like thus operated as a future-oriented suspension, such that 
potentiation (coupled with ongoing subjugation), rather than immediate recognition, became 
definitional of the condition of blackness. In this sense, describing this encapsulation as a 
project of infantilization is inadequate as it misrecognizes the reality that anti-blackness 
renders black subjects another order of the human. Seen as unable to ever come into 
adulthood-as-whiteness, we might more critically understand this maneuver as a temporal 
positioning of blackness within a suspended potentiation and subjection. Here, positioning 
black subjects precisely as the “not yet” mitigated what could have been the radical 
consequences of childhood as freedom and blackness as childhood. 
As such, it was perhaps as a precise irony structured through black childhood, that the 
framing of adult slaves as child-like—as requiring emancipation on the fact that they deserve, 
like children, to eventually become free—set the stage for the prolonged and gradual 
emancipation of enslaved children. The terms of infantilization-as-critique-of-a-racial-order, 
terms which relied on the understanding that children are defined by a gradual progression 
into becoming a rights bearing subject, were deeply insidious for black children in the 
formalization of emancipation. As I have shown through an analysis of the terms of gradual 
emancipation, this subject positioning of ‘becoming’ was one of mandated and suspended 
limbo. It was specifically designed such that the promise of ‘freedom’ would not come into 
fruition for black children, even as whites congratulated themselves for the successes of 
Northern abolition.  
 
Adolescent Citizenship 
I began this article by asking about the hold that black childhood and adolescence have on 
futurity. This question carries a particularly somber tone in this section as my attention turns 
from the antebellum era to the post-racial one, and specifically to a particular instantiation of 
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the discursive landscape that emerged in the aftermath of the murder of Trayvon Martin. 
Having just argued that the notion of the child’s future progression into adulthood 
undergirded the persistence of the conditions of slavery for black children and adolescents 
amidst claims to Northern abolition, I turn now to an analysis of black childhood and 
adolescence in the contemporary moment. Here, the conditions of anti-black violence 
directed at black children and childhood continue to be facilitated through dehumanizing 
temporal positionings, while the insidious terms of alleged ‘progress’ shift from a celebration 
of antebellum emancipation to an extolling of a post-racial and colorblind society. And yet, 
my reading here is one of persistence, not dissonance. As I demonstrate in relation to Martin, 
there are legacies of the temporal suspension of antebellum black childhood which must be 
understood as resonating in the reiterated positioning of Martin not as a child nor as an adult, 
but rather as a teenager.  
In the years following Martin’s murder, a number of scholars have argued that 
Martin, like many other young black boys before and after him, was systematically denied 
access to childhood. The racialized and gendered curtailment of black boyhood, it is argued, 
both set the scene for Martin’s murder, and was the ground upon which his murder was 
subsequently justified by the jury and within public discourse. What T. Elon Dancy II 
describes as the “adultification of black boys,”40 in other words, was one of the central 
conditions by which Martin was “marked for death” during his life.41 This adultification, 
Dancy, drawing upon Ferguson, argues, means that behavior which is understood as childish 
carelessness in white boys is reinterpreted through racist fantasies of violence as “willful, 
destructive, and irrational” behavior in black boys that must be controlled.42 As such, 
Martin’s black masculinity, Casanova and Webb write, “caused him to unintentionally 
embody danger.”43 Part of what marked Martin as dangerous and marked for death, then, was 
the fact that the image of the black child, and the construction of black boyhood specifically, 
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are, as Vargas and James note, “always already framed by the image of the menacing black 
[adult].”44 Here, the anti-blackness which marked Martin as dangerous was intensified, they 
argue, through the threat that the black boy child figures; inflected by the fears surrounding 
black masculinity, they write, it was “impossible for him not [to] be threatening.”45 This 
adultification of black boys is extraordinarily pervasive, and has devastating consequences. It 
produces a “ubiquitous criminalization” that Victor M. Rios calls the “youth control 
complex,” a system in which multiple institutions from schools to the police work together to 
render young black people’s everyday acts as criminalized activities.46 In the words of 
Dumas and Nelson, this adultification renders black boyhood “both unimagined and 
unimaginable.”47 The inability to imagine black boyhood became crystalized in the aftermath 
of Martin’s murder in extraordinary and perverse ways; as Dancy reports, some media 
pundits were so determined to deny Martin’s childhood, that they questioned the very validity 
of his birth certificate.
48
  
Zimmerman himself was unable to imagine Martin as a child. In analyzing the 
moment of Martin’s encounter with Zimmerman, the ramifications of being unable to 
imagine black boyhood become explicit. On the phone to the police dispatcher, Zimmerman 
described Martin as in his late teens, only to later suggest (during his arraignment) that he 
assumed Martin to be in his mid- to late twenties.
49
 As Dumas and Nelson write, 
Zimmerman’s tactic of defending his killing of Martin “centered on constructing the 
seventeen-year-old as an adult man with suspect movements, threatening physicality, and 
malevolent intentions.”50 In the subsequent months leading up to his trial, Zimmerman’s legal 
team directly linked Martin’s culpability to his no longer being a child. In one press release, 
Zimmerman’s legal team explicitly contested the framing of Martin as an innocent child:  
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[I]t is lunacy to think that the “fresh-faced” boy in the red T-shirt [depicted in an 
image Martin’s family distributed] could successfully physically assault George 
Zimmerman -- which is George's claim, and it is no stretch to believe that the young 
man [Martin] pictured in the 7-11 security footage [taken the night of Martin’s 
murder] could.
51
  
 
Here, the move from “boy” to “young man” functions precisely as the clarifying evidence of 
Martin’s respective move from innocent to guilty. Interestingly, however, as Martin’s lawyer 
notes, the image of Martin as a “boy” that Zimmerman’s legal team was contesting was taken 
only six months prior to the security footage that they offered instead.
52
 This contradictory 
and mixed reading of Martin as boy and man might make for an interesting challenge to 
Zimmerman’s capacity to assess Martin’s age, let alone his innocence. However, this 
inability to accurately age-assess a black child is not only beholden to Zimmerman. 
Numerous studies have shown the propensity of juries, police officers, and doctors to assume 
that black children are older than they in fact are.
53
 Here, then, Zimmerman’s inability to 
properly age assess Martin is part and parcel of a wider condition of childhood under anti-
blackness. This “inability” to properly age assess might thus be evidence not just of 
Zimmerman’s (mis)recognition, but rather of the pervasiveness of the discrepant 
ambivalences that define black childhood under anti-blackness. 
Along these lines, it is important to insert some ambivalence into the diagnosis of 
Martin’s adultification. As Billings writes, contemporary black boyhood is constituted not 
just by a straightforward removal of black boys from childhood, but rather by a paradox 
whereby “mainstream perceptions of them vacillate between making them babies and making 
them men.”54 This “vacillation,” however, needs slightly more attending to, as the 
assumption that one’s removal from childhood inherently places one into adulthood does not 
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adequately reflect the ways in which Martin was generally positioned not as an adult but as a 
teenager. It is necessary, I argue, to untangle the specific implications of the tenuous 
positioning of Martin as an adolescent, as this positioning undergirded a range of national 
tensions about racial belonging which are distinct from those that disallow black boys the 
space of childhood.  
 Repeated depictions of Martin’s death by Zimmerman’s legal team and in the mass 
media used racialized and gendered language to locate Martin firmly in a deviant 
adolescence. Giving an account of one of the earlier gatherings of people in Sanford to 
protest the lack of Zimmerman’s arrest, the Miami Herald, for example, provided this 
description:  
 
As thousands of people gathered here to demand an arrest in the Trayvon Martin case, 
a more complicated portrait began to emerge of a teenager whose problems at school 
ranged from getting spotted defacing lockers to getting caught with a marijuana 
baggie and women’s jewelry. The Miami Gardens teen who has become a national 
symbol of racial injustice was suspended three times, and had a spotty school record 
that his family’s attorneys say is irrelevant.55 
 
Instead of beginning with a description of the protest that thousands attended, the Miami 
Herald opened with a damning account of Martin’s past. This “complicated” portrayal of 
Martin as a “troubled teenager” was reiterated by multiple outlets and can be seen, for 
example, in the headlines of these news features: “Trayvon Martin: Typical teen or 
troublemaker?”56 “Trayvon Martin was suspended three times from school”57 This narrative 
was further reified in a CNN report: 
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Who really was Trayvon Martin? There is plenty of speculation, including some 
bloggers who point to his recent school suspensions — including for drug residue in 
his backpack — and images of him sporting tattoos and what appeared to be a gold 
tooth grill as possible evidence of a troubled teen.
58
 
 
Echoing the reporting in the Miami Herald, this article questions Martin’s innocence and 
removes him from childhood. Like the examples cited above, this article’s insistence on 
making Martin’s life a question (“Who really was Trayvon Martin?”), and its reiteration of 
the troubled teen discourse, suggests that it is understandable to not just question Martin’s 
foreshortened life, but also to question the grieveability of his death. But what, precisely, is 
taking place in the reiteration of Martin as a “troubled teen”?  
The use of adolescence rather than childhood in these depictions of Martin as a 
troubled teen clearly emerges out of a continued investment in the reification of deviance as 
located in black communities and particularly in black masculinity—as is clear from the 
racialized objects of deviance used to defame martin: marijuana, graffiti, a gold grill.
59
 These 
accounts, I argue, extrapolated this deviance, and this adolescence, onto black communities 
more generally, and specifically onto those engaged in protest over the justice department’s 
refusal to arrest Zimmerman. The Miami Herald article, for example, connected directly, in 
the exact same sentence, Martin’s becoming a “national symbol of racial injustice” with his 
“spotty school record,” making this link as a way of both discrediting Martin and connecting 
his alleged deviance to those demanding justice. The implication of reiterating this rhetorical 
maneuver is that if, as the speculations assert, Martin was a troublesome teenager, then those 
gathered in his support might also be supporting of, or indifferent to, his complicated past. 
The protestors—as well as, I would argue, their concerns about racial injustice—thus become 
as “complicated” and as problematic to support as Martin himself.60   
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And yet, something else seems to be at stake here. Inherent in the descriptions of 
Martin’s past is an additional affective tone that pairs the necessity of naming Martin as an 
adolescent with a sense of frustration, elation, and righteousness. The following descriptions, 
which bring this argument into relief, are saturated with intense affect. This saturation, 
however, allows for the exposing of what I would call a particular national sentiment (one 
which arguably lingers within the above defaming narratives). To give an initial sense of the 
affective weight that adolescence carries in this context, I provide a hostile reader comment 
(since deleted) on an article from the Huffington Post: 
 
[The] headline news […] have him [Zimmerman] guilty already[. ]They of all people 
should know the way the law works. […] They [the mass media, as well as Martin’s 
mother] are all pot stirrers and should wait for the outcome of this trial. [T]here is no 
doubt in my mind that Trayvon could have been the aggressor. Also they should stop 
showing his picture when he was 5 or 6... Let[’]s remind people that he was 
suspended from school for drugs, burglary tools[, ]having women[’]s jewelry and 
tardiness. This teen is no angel.....
61
 
 
While there is much to say, and to challenge, about this quote, I want to ask: What does it 
mean to take this comment seriously as an indication of the political work that adolescence—
as a specific racialized negation of childhood—does within the post-racial moment? Here, the 
phrasing of “this teen is no angel” cannot be understood as purely beholden to this 
commenter. This reiterated phrase was so central to depictions of Martin that it appeared in a 
feature article for the New York Times—“But Trayvon was a teenager, not an angel”62—and 
it was so proliferative that it was the second search suggestion for Google following the 
phrase “Trayvon Martin was.”63 In this particular usage, the commenter’s palpable racist 
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anger is clearly being cathected by Martin’s portrayal as a child, and by what they imagine to 
be a collective refusal to recognize Martin’s actual age. The images of Martin as a young 
child are thus posed here as manipulative and as sharing an incendiary distortion that this 
author argues is inherent to those supporting Martin.  
Putting this comment into the context of a wider array of similar ones—ones, like the 
following excerpt from a blog entry, which is even more explicit in its declaration of racist 
outrage—we can begin to understand precisely what is taking place here:  
 
At the time of the shooting, the media and Martin’s family, abetted by race hustlers 
Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton, portrayed Zimmerman as a trigger-happy racist […] 
A congresswoman portrayed it thusly: Martin was [a] “sweet young boy hunted down 
like a dog.” It turned out that Martin was anything but sweet, despite the 
media’s repeatedly showing photographs of him that led readers and viewers to 
believe he was only 12 or 13 years old when he was shot.
64
  
 
Across these comments, we can build a picture of what might be called a particular national 
feeling, or what I am calling adolescent citizenship. As the affect in this writing makes clear, 
what is at stake in proving Martin’s guilt via his placement in late adolescence hinges on this 
author’s (clearly incensed) feelings about racial belonging. What is revealed in the affect that 
structures this and the former reiterations of Martin’s adolescence, I argue, is the link 
between the negation of black childhood and the negation of black citizenship. Central to 
these accounts is the connecting—through vitriolic affect—of Martin’s location within a 
troubling adolescence to a defamation of those advocating for him: his parents, civil rights 
activists, protestors, politicians. This affect tells us something specific about Martin’s 
relationship to a post-racial moment where, as I outline further below, minor and major 
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progress towards racial justice has been experienced by many white Americans as an 
injurious personal attack. Attending to the shared affective register of these articulations, I 
argue, demonstrates that what is at stake in Martin’s location in adolescence far surpasses its 
implication for Martin or Zimmerman. It is precisely from within an analysis of this affect 
that my conceptualization of adolescent citizenship emerges.  
To explain what I mean here, and to articulate it in relation to adolescent citizenship, 
let me first briefly define this particular framing of the post-racial moment. In one of its 
genealogies, this term describes an assumed reality in which racial tensions and inequalities 
are deemed to be irrelevant already. Along these lines, Lawrence Bobo argues that “post-
racialism” is a fantasy in which white Americans believe that society has “genuinely moved 
beyond race—so much so that we as a nation are now ready to transcend the disabling racial 
divisions of the past.”65 For Lisa Marie Cacho, the post-racial is also a resistance to 
acknowledging disavowed yet persistent structural racism. For Cacho, this resistance gets 
combined with “an ideology of white injury depicting European Americans as ‘victims’ of 
efforts to remedy racial discrimination.”66 The white injury discourse thus produces, and is a 
product of, a fantasy of racial relations which imagines that “minorities (especially blacks) 
are the ones responsible for whatever ‘race problem’ we have in this country.”67 This 
affective reversal of suffering illuminates the psychic life of colorblind racial politics, but it 
also suggests something further.  
Because injured white affects, particularly those which emerge in relationship to 
Martin’s murder, are tied to notions of temporality and progress, they suture the nation to a 
fantasmatic race-neutral present, while containing black people themselves in a backwards, 
or out-of-time, relation to it. What is taking place within the above accounts of Martin is a 
reiterated attempt by the authors to have the final say over how, and where, Martin exists 
within time. How old Martin is understood to be, whether or not he should have had a future, 
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how and if he should be represented, and what images and narratives of his past should be 
used: all these are temporal negotiations. In this sense, these accounts resonate with Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva’s analysis of the importance of temporal positionings to white people’s 
fantasies of the post-racial. In his interviews, one of the temporal demands white people place 
on black communities and those advocating for race-conscious politics is to “get with the 
times.” Bonilla-Silva writes: 
 
In case after case, […] respondents vented anger about what they interpreted as 
blacks’ whining (“I didn’t own any slaves and I do not understand why they keep 
asking for things when slavery ended 200 God-damned years ago!”) […] The story 
lines then serve whites as legitimate conduits for expressing anger, animosity, and 
resentment toward racial minorities.
68
 
 
In this quote, the relationship between affect and the refusal to acknowledge ongoing racism 
by white people is clearly structured through a negotiation of temporality. White anger is 
directed at black people for not conforming to a particular framing of history and the present. 
The way that anger functions within this quote mirrors the accounts of Martin’s childhood 
given above: the demand that Martin’s childhood is over and needs to be gotten over works 
akin to the claim that slavery has ended and needs to be properly placed in the past. Both 
indicate that negotiating competing understandings of temporality becomes vital to how 
racism is acknowledged, and by whom.  
These narratives position the white people who deploy them as temporally located in 
a present that, they imagine, black people have not yet emerged into. As such, this claim of 
black “whining,” or what might be understood as the assumed temporal dislocation of black 
critique, functions as an infantilizing interpellation through which the whining subject is 
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situated as both childish and out of time. Here, the demand of “getting with the times” can 
thus be understood as functioning like a demand to “grow up.”  One could argue that this 
derision of black critique as “whining” is therefore straightforwardly an infantilizing 
discourse, positioning Martin and his supporters as what Lauren Berlant would call “infantile 
citizens.” Here, the “image of the citizen as a minor, female, youthful victim,” Berlant writes, 
justifies and produces a state whose “adult citizens, especially adult men” are primarily 
mobilized around civil protection, and the regulation of sexuality.
69
 The infantile citizen, 
whom Berlant argues is “tacitly white,” is a subject positioning which requires protecting 
because its paired innocence and patriotic utopianism stakes a claim on a future which both 
maintains the structural position of those currently in power, and demands a resurgence of 
un-critical nationalism.
70
 
Mirroring my argument about the complexities of infantilization in the antebellum 
era, here too I suggest that the appropriateness of infantilization to wholly describe what is 
taking place in relation to Martin and the post racial falters. Analyzing infantilization in 
relationship to the landscape of representation that sought to characterize Martin not as a 
child, but instead as an adolescent, it becomes clear that Martin is only ever ambivalently 
placed within an infantile position. As the quotes above make clear, it is demanded that he be 
read as a juvenile.  
While the fantasmatic relations that adulthood has to childhood are often, as Berlant 
notes, ones of paternalism, care, and protection (with all the insidiousness that these relations 
have for colonized, enslaved, and infantilized subjects), these relations can become messy 
and difficult in adolescence. As Cohen writes, adolescence was historically produced within 
the discourse of moral panic, as a dangerous space of “limbo” which is “characterized by 
conflict, uncertainty, defiance and deviance.”71 In adolescence, the relation of dependency 
can become a central site of conflict, as parents and teenagers grapple with how much 
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independence and autonomy teenagers can have, and what rights and privileges they are 
afforded. Adolescence, therefore, becomes a negotiated period of the child’s progression into 
their future adulthood, but it is still one that is negotiated, for many, through a power 
dynamic that carries over from childhood. By marking Martin as an adolescent rather than a 
child or an adult, those defending Zimmerman (and those accounts questioning Martin’s 
grieveability) also interpellated those advocating for justice in Martin’s name into relational 
tropes that posited them as precociously demanding—on behalf of Martin—to be recognized 
as adult subjects. 
This is the central condition of adolescent citizenship: a subject positioning which 
negates the subject’s demands for recognition and equality on the grounds that they have yet 
to deserve full citizenship rights. Unlike infantile citizenship, which defines citizenship by 
and for “fetuses, children, real and imaginary migrants—persons that, paradoxically, cannot 
act yet as citizens,”72 adolescent citizenship describes subjects who can act as citizens, but 
whose acts of citizenship are derided and negated for being out of temporal sync with a 
fantasy of the nation’s present. While infantile citizenship produces mixed and ambivalent 
relations of paternalism and care, adolescent citizenship negates the demand of recognition or 
justice by demarcating the subject as immature (and thus unworthy of the right), and by 
figuring the demand itself as out of sync (and thus precocious, if not alternatively 
anachronistic). Adolescent citizenship, then, is the produced relation between some citizens 
and the nation which both maintains the nation’s paternalism, and additionally interrupts the 
adolescent citizen’s demand for rights and recognition under the guise of the subject’s and 
the demand’s inappropriate timing.  
The troubled teen discourse thus functions on a few different levels. In a 
straightforward sense, it became a way of refuting Martin’s innocence through a negation of 
his location in childhood. Beyond this register of subject-positioning, however, what I am 
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arguing was also central to this discourse was its marking of black critique as itself a 
temporal dislocation, and thus as evidence for the claim that black people were not yet ready 
to occupy a paternal relationship to the nation. Mapped to the fantasies of differently situated 
subjects of historical and contemporary racial relations the placement of Martin into 
adolescence by those whose structural grip on America was presumed to be under threat 
(those experiencing white injury), can be read as an attempt to re-establish the authority of 
whiteness in a post-racial moment confronted by a national spectacle of black death. In this 
vein, the very demand that black people be recognized as full citizens is what justifies their 
location outside the frames of intelligibility the post-racial state relies on. As such, we can 
understand this belittling discourse of adolescence in relation to Martin in the face of the 
demands that he be recognized both as an innocent child victim and as a valid subject and 
citizen of America, as being indicative of a post-racial desire to re-affirm the partial-
subjectivity of black people in the face of the alleged success of the civil rights movement.  
 
Conclusion: Out of Time 
One of the central questions that has animated this paper has been: What does it mean for 
black critique, black subjects, and specifically black children, to be understood as “out of 
time” precisely at the very moment that emancipation, freedom, and equality are allegedly 
taking hold? In answering this question, I have offered the language of adolescent 
citizenship, a relation of negation consistent across these two eras whereby one’s positioning 
as out of time—as having departed from a nascent subjective space, but not yet being 
understood as deserving one’s proper claim to full citizenship, full adulthood, nor even the 
present itself—is the basis of persistent anti-blackness. This positioning, this negation of 
black citizenship through the justificatory uses of temporality has, I have argued, drastically 
and unequally been the burden of black childhood. And yet, while we could argue that the 
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proper response to this temporal negation is to demand that black children and black critique 
be genuinely understood as legitimate denizens of the now, my argument, following Mark 
Rifkin,
73
 is rather to demand a re-thinking of the now, and of temporality, itself. Indeed, if 
what is understood to be most fundamentally out of time across these two eras is a critique of 
state violence aimed at young black people, and the potential for black freedom to itself 
disrupt the normative order of anti-blackness, then perhaps being unmoved by the falsity of 
progress, and instead moored in an anachronism that more accurately reflects the pervasive 
injustices of the ongoing present, is where our critique needs to begin. 
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